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The American labor force will be transformed as the twenty-ﬁ  rst cen-
tury unfolds, a change that will confront policymakers and business ﬁ  rms 
with new challenges and new opportunities. The impending slowdown of 
labor force growth that will accompany the retirement of the baby boom 
generation already is playing a central role in national debates over the 
future solvency of Social Security and Medicare, as well as U.S. immi-
gration policies. But labor supply changes will be inﬂ  uenced by other 
dimensions as well. In the coming decades, American workers are likely 
to be, on average, older and better educated than today’s labor force. 
The globalization of labor markets is already opening new employment 
opportunities for some Americans and changing the wage rates paid 
to others. The production technologies and personnel policies adopted 
by tomorrow’s ﬁ  rms will undoubtedly reﬂ  ect the numbers and types of 
workers available for employment.
To explore the labor-supply trends that will affect economic policymak-
ing in the twenty-ﬁ  rst century, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston chose 
“Labor Supply in the New Century” as the theme for its 52nd Annual 
Economic Conference held in June 2007. In analyzing these future trends, 
it is helpful to consider how these changes will affect both the quantity 
of workers in the U.S. labor force and the quality of their skills. In terms 
of the policy implications, the supply of American workers is of obvious 
importance to the Federal Reserve System, because the size of the U.S. 
labor force is a direct input to the Fed’s estimate of the nation’s poten-
tial economic output. Moreover, in the short run, the Federal Reserve 
needs to understand the various ways in which the quantity of labor Introduction 4
supply adjusts to changes in labor demand during business cycles. But 
while business cycle expansions and recessions exert powerful short-run 
impacts on labor-market outcomes, long-run living standards are deter-
mined by the quality of skills in the aggregate labor force and the types of 
human and physical capital that workers can use when performing their 
jobs. The worker-quality dimension to labor force trends, and the impact 
that these trends have on capital accumulation, are therefore fundamen-
tal to policies designed to raise living standards or to expand economic 
opportunity throughout the population. 
The conference’s six papers and its keynote address by Eugene Steuerle 
provide a broad overview of the quantity and quality implications of 
labor-supply trends. The ﬁ  rst paper, by Bruce Fallick and Jonathan Pin-
gle, carefully documents the extent of the upcoming slowdown in labor 
force growth due to the aging of the population. Alicia Munnell and Ste-
ven Sass, co-authors of the second paper, investigate the likely labor-sup-
ply behavior of older workers, including the baby boomers born between 
1946 and 1964, the oldest of whom are now approaching traditional 
retirement ages, based on the behavior of past cohorts. The third paper, 
by David Autor, discusses the rising income inequality in the U.S. labor 
market over the last 15 years, and highlights the domestic and interna-
tional forces that will affect wage inequality in the future. Robert E. Hall, 
author of the fourth paper, discusses how domestic labor supply adjusts 
to ﬂ  uctuations in labor demand during the typical business cycle. The 
ﬁ  fth paper, jointly written by Dale Jorgenson, Richard Goettle, Mun Ho, 
Daniel Slesnick, and Peter Wilcoxen, outlines the likely U.S. trends in 
both labor supply and labor demand up to 2030; the authors predict that 
these trends point to much lower growth in future aggregate output. 
I.  Quantity and Quality Dimensions of Labor Force Trends
Labor Quantity and the Aging of the American Labor Force
A recurrent theme in the conference sessions is the widespread impact 
that the aging of the U.S. population will have on the nation’s workforce. 
Among the conference participants, there was a clear consensus that the 
demographics of aging will have a quantitatively important effect on the 
future size of the U.S. labor force. But how large might this aging effect 
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actually be? And how effective will public policy be in shaping and con-
trolling the outcomes of this effect?
Population aging will reduce the aggregate labor force participation 
rate, deﬁ  ned as the fraction of all U.S. residents at least 16 years old who 
are either employed or actively searching for work. As Fallick and Pingle 
point out, increases in the fraction of the population reaching traditional 
retirement ages will reduce the overall labor force participation rate. But 
several other factors are working to increase the age at which Ameri-
can workers are likely to retire. Munnell and Sass contend that beneﬁ  t 
changes in Social Security and private pension plans will reduce the ade-
quacy of retirement income derived from these sources. These reductions 
will encourage some older individuals to keep working, at least part-
time, beyond traditional retirement ages. Stanford Ross explores addi-
tional institutional changes that might reduce early-retirement incentives, 
while several conference discussants note that the labor force participa-
tion rates of older women may increase in the future. Throughout their 
lives, women in the baby boom generation have had higher participation 
rates that did earlier cohorts of women, and this trend might continue as 
baby boomer women enter their 60s. 
Moreover, work lives could be prolonged by recent changes in the 
nature of employment and the characteristics of today’s older workers. 
The physical demands of work that older generations routinely con-
fronted have generally decreased; jobs in ofﬁ  ces are typically easier, from 
a physical standpoint, than those performed in factories or on farms. The 
health of older Americans has also improved, so prolonging one’s work-
ing life may be feasible even in more demanding positions. Policy changes 
might also prompt older individuals to increase their labor supply. Ross 
notes that the current legal framework is favorable to taking early retire-
ment, but that this policy orientation could change to promote greater 
labor force participation among older workers.
Quantity effects stemming from the aging of the population may also 
have more subtle effects on the labor market. Autor hypothesizes that as 
the elderly’s share of the population increases, so too will the demand for 
personal services, like home aides or healthcare workers, jobs typically 
performed by relatively less-educated workers. As a result, population 
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provide increased incentives for labor force participation among low-
skilled workers. Munnell and Sass discuss a different effect that aging 
will likely have on the wage structure: the increased relative supply of 
older workers will act to decrease the premium paid for labor market 
experience.
An additional effect of population aging on the labor market will oper-
ate through the nation’s social insurance programs. Even if some of the 
policy changes currently being contemplated are enacted, Social Secu-
rity and Medicare will constitute a growing share of federal expenditures 
and national economic output. Payroll taxes may need to be increased 
to help reduce long-run structural deﬁ  cits in these programs, potentially 
exacerbating tax distortions that affect labor supply. Beneﬁ  t generosity 
may also be further reduced, amplifying the retirement income adequacy 
effects discussed by Munnell and Sass. The increasing size of social insur-
ance expenditures may tie the hands of future government policymakers, 
leaving little room for increased expenditures on programs serving the 
young. This indirect effect resulting from population aging could have an 
important impact on the future U.S. labor market by limiting the extent 
of programs, such as early childhood education, designed to increase 
workforce quality. 
Trends in Labor Quality
While the conference consensus is that demographic shifts will undoubt-
edly lead to slower growth in the quantity of labor supplied, the outlook 
for labor quality is more encouraging. An increase in workforce quality is 
expected to offset, to some degree, the quantitative decline in labor force 
growth. The American workforce is considerably more educated today 
than it was twenty years ago, and education levels among American 
workers are expected to continue rising. Higher educational attainment 
is encouraged by the faster wage growth that college-educated workers 
have recently experienced, a development that itself reﬂ  ects the ongoing 
shift in labor demand toward the high end of the skill distribution. 
The precise size of the expected “quality offset” to lower labor-supply 
growth is difﬁ  cult to gauge. As Autor documents, the pace of increase 
in college enrollments and completion rates has slowed in recent years. 
Since, as Autor says, “the gap in college attendance by parental income, 
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race, and ethnicity remains large,” there is room to increase the overall 
quality of the U.S. labor force in at least two ways. First, policies should 
facilitate pre-school investments in human capital, and second, policies 
should promote college enrollment among low- and moderate-income 
families. Gary Burtless, one of the paper’s discussants, explores the rea-
sons that men in the United States have lower college completion rates 
than men in other rich nations. He suggests that less-afﬂ  uent parents have 
few resources available to inﬂ  uence their children to take a far-sighted 
view of the future payoffs that higher education brings. Hence, children 
from these families are less likely to make the investments of time and 
money that obtaining a college degree requires. In addition, Autor notes 
that immigration policy can provide an additional lever to further raise 
the skill and education levels of the U.S. labor force.
By incorporating labor quality into their model of the U.S. economy, 
Jorgenson, Goettle, Ho, Slesnick, and Wilcoxen account for changes in 
both the education and experience of the U.S. labor force. The authors 
assume that the educational composition of the U.S. population will 
eventually stabilize. This assumption leads labor quality to continue to 
rise for some time, but with the increases gradually diminishing during 
the next 25 years. According to this model, the quality-adjusted effective 
labor force continues growing more rapidly than the working-age popu-
lation, but only modestly so. Even after accounting for increasing quality 
in the American workforce, the authors are only slightly more positive 
than Fallick and Pingle—who account only for quantity changes—about 
potential growth in the U.S. economy in the next several decades.
II. Conference  Summary
Session 1: The Outlook for Labor Supply in the United States
The ﬁ  rst session’s paper provides an overview of the effects of demo-
graphic change on aggregate U.S. labor force participation, assessing 
shifts in age and gender mix as well as historical and possible future 
changes in participation rates for age by gender subgroups. Bruce Fallick 
and Jonathan Pingle argue that a key factor driving aggregate changes 
in labor force participation in coming years will be the evolution of the 
age distribution of the population—speciﬁ   cally, the movement of the Introduction 8
distribution’s baby boom “bulge” from older working ages into their 
retirement years, traditionally assumed to start at age 55 and beyond. 
The authors note that increases in within-group participation rates can 
offset some of the downward pressure from population aging, but avoid-
ing a decline in the aggregate labor force participation rate would require 
very substantial—and unlikely—increases in participation rates across all 
age groups. 
The age mix of the U.S. population will change substantially during the 
next 35 years. For example, the Census Bureau projects that the portion 
of individuals aged 35 to 44 years will shrink from about 18 percent of 
the population to about 15 percent, while the fraction of those aged 65 
years and older will rise from about 16 percent to 25 percent. Applying 
current (2005) participation rates by age and gender to these shifting 
age shares, Fallick and Pingle provide a simple forecast of the aggregate 
U.S. labor force participation rate that declines from about 66 percent in 
2005 to about 63 percent around 2020, and to less than 60 percent by 
2033 and years thereafter. The authors then compare population share 
projections made by the Social Security Administration with those fore-
cast by the Census Bureau, and note that taking account of increased 
longevity, especially among older women, causes the Census Bureau’s 
population projections to imply a lower aggregate U.S. labor force par-
ticipation rate. Similarly, differing assumptions about future immigration 
also change the projected age mix of the population, as immigrants are 
typically concentrated in age groups with high labor force participation 
rates; in addition, immigrants may be more likely to be labor market 
participants than native-born individuals, conditional on age. Fallick and 
Pingle simulate the effects of various immigration assumptions, and note 
that even fairly substantial increases in immigration, accompanied by 
above-average participation by immigrants, only modestly offset future 
declines in aggregate labor force participation rates. They note, however, 
that the effects of changing immigration ﬂ  ows or life expectancy on the 
size of the labor force (calculated as the participation rate multiplied by 
population size) will be more positive than these effects on the aggregate 
participation rate.
With their baseline projection of a 6 percentage point drop in the aggre-
gate participation rate over the next 30 years, Fallick and Pingle next 
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examine the possible effects of changes in speciﬁ  c age-by-gender group 
labor force participation rates. They compare the participation rate pro-
jections of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Social Security Administra-
tion, and their own cohort-based model. In terms of the gender-and-age 
interactions, a key question is whether older Americans, or a subset of 
older Americans, will begin to work longer than similar age groups did in 
the past. Most forecasters expect that better health, increased life expec-
tancies, changing preferences, or changing inducements provided by gov-
ernment and business will lead many older Americans in coming decades 
to remain in the labor force longer. Such a change may have important 
effects on aggregate participation because this shift would occur in a fast-
expanding segment of the population; indeed, Fallick and Pingle indicate 
that increases forecasted in participation among older women, meaning 
those aged 65 years and above, would offset roughly one-quarter of the 
projected total decline in labor force participation attributable to aging. 
For prime-age workers, those men and women who are 25–54 years old, 
the three forecasts differ substantially: the Bureau of Labor Statistics esti-
mate is the most optimistic about future prime-age increases, while the 
Social Security Administration’s forecast is in the middle of the pack, and 
the Fallick and Pingle model predicts a continuation of current participa-
tion rate trends, which reﬂ  ect long-term declines in the participation rates 
of prime-age American men, and recent declines for prime-age Ameri-
can women. Teenagers, while a small fraction of the U.S. population, 
have contributed substantially to recent aggregate declines in labor force 
participation, and also to differences among the three forecasts. All in 
all, these forecasts of aggregate labor force participation “diverge notice-
ably,” according to Fallick and Pingle; nonetheless, all three indicate that 
“likely” changes in the participation rates of various subgroups will only 
partially offset the aging-related declines in aggregate participation rates 
or even, according to the authors’ own projections, possibly exacerbate 
these declines.
Fallick and Pingle examine potential policy changes, such as increases 
in Social Security’s “normal retirement age” and “delayed retirement 
credit,” which might alter the likely future path of labor force participa-
tion among older Americans. While such changes could have important 
effects on future participation rates, they note that policy changes for Introduction 10
Social Security have been gradual in the past, and are impossible to fore-
cast in the future. Fallick and Pingle conclude their analysis by predicting 
that “the outlook is for slower growth in U.S. labor supply from 2007 
onward than was the norm in the 1965–2000 period.”
The paper’s ﬁ  rst discussant, Chinhui Juhn, takes issue with the Fal-
lick and Pingle forecast of older Americans’ future labor force partici-
pation rates. She argues that increased participation by older women, 
through complementarity of spouses’ leisure, may have accounted for 
over one-third of the increase in older men’s participation rate during 
the 1996–2006 period—and that this effect may manifest in similar ways 
in the future. Furthermore, Juhn notes that recent and ongoing declines 
in employer-provided retiree health insurance are likely to push up the 
participation rates of the 55–64 year old age group nearing the Medicare 
eligibility age, as well as those for adults aged 65 years and older. She 
questions Fallick and Pingle’s forecast of continued declines in prime-
age women’s labor force participation, noting that steeper recent declines 
in the participation rates of never-married women and women without 
children provide “little evidence that the trend among married moth-
ers—the group that fueled the increases in the earlier decades [the 1970s 
and 1980s]—has actually reversed and begun to decline.” 
Instead, Juhn argues, the pervasiveness of recent declines in participa-
tion rates among prime-age women points to time effects—speciﬁ  cally 
weak labor market conditions—not to cohort effects. She then explores 
what she views as a problem with the cohort-based model that underpins 
the Fallick and Pingle forecasts, speciﬁ  cally the assumption that the coef-
ﬁ  cients on time-varying variables such as cyclical factors, education, fer-
tility, and marriage are constant over time. Juhn contends that it is likely 
that these coefﬁ  cients are shifting, introducing error into the estimated 
cohort effects and hence into the forecasts. Her ﬁ  nal comment notes that 
this paper’s topic, the future size of the U.S. labor force, is very important 
because, in conjunction with labor productivity, the size of the nation’s 
workforce affects the economy’s potential growth. But to fully understand 
the predicted declines in the size of the labor force and these ramiﬁ  cations, 
she argues that we need to pay more attention to the types of labor that 
are forecast to shrink, and we must also sort out the degree to which cur-
rent labor force trends reﬂ  ect cyclical supply versus demand shifts.
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Lisa Lynch, the second discussant, focuses on two aspects of the Fallick 
and Pingle paper: their analyses of likely changes in immigration and in 
labor force participation by prime-age women. She questions whether 
the authors’ simulations of the impacts of “high” immigration—adding 
200,000 immigrants annually beyond current ﬂ  ows—is actually so high. 
Lynch appeals to the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce’s recent estimates that 
proposed immigration legislation would add 180,000 workers each year 
for the next ten years, and she also notes that immigrants tend to partici-
pate in the labor force at above-average rates, conditional on age. In addi-
tion, Lynch contends that even though immigrants’ effects on aggregate 
participation rates are muted by their addition to both the numerator 
and denominator, they do increase the overall labor supply; furthermore, 
immigration policy may shift the skill mix of immigrants, with corre-
sponding effects on their contributions to economic growth.
She challenges Fallick and Pingle to ask why men’s participation rates 
have been declining before assuming these declines will continue, and 
raises a number of questions about the authors’ assumption that prime-
age women’s participation rates will decline in coming years. First, the 
fact that women’s level of participation is not equal to that of men raises 
questions about why the pace of decline in women’s participation should 
be similar to men’s. Second, labor force participation is positively asso-
ciated with educational attainment, and since the early 1990s women’s 
college-enrollment rates have been rising faster than men’s. In addition, 
Lynch argues that technological changes have contributed to increases in 
women’s age at the birth of their ﬁ  rst child, with implications for their 
labor force attachment before becoming mothers as well as likely life-
time participation patterns. Finally, like Juhn, Lynch notes that interest 
in future labor force participation—at least among monetary policymak-
ers—centers on its implications for future output growth; in this context, 
the increased average “experience” of an older workforce should enhance 
labor productivity and more than proportionally add to output gains.
Session 2: The Labor Supply of Older Americans
Alicia Munnell and Steven Sass examine the labor supply of older Ameri-
cans, a group they deﬁ  ne as those aged 55 years and up, paying particular 
attention to men in this age group. Munnell and Sass point to several Introduction 12
changes in the American retirement income system that are making it 
necessary for people to continue labor force activity at later ages than 
was the norm among older cohorts in the second half of the twentieth 
century. Social Security’s Full (Normal) Retirement Age has been gradu-
ally increasing from 65 to 67, resulting in an effective cut in beneﬁ  ts for 
workers retiring at any given age. In the coming years, rising Medicare 
premiums and increased taxation of Social Security income are virtu-
ally certain, and further cuts in Social Security beneﬁ  ts to restore the 
System’s long-term ﬁ  scal balance are possible. Private pensions have also 
been transformed over the last two decades, with deﬁ  ned contribution 
plans, such as 401(k)s, largely replacing traditional deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans. 
Unfortunately, to date workers’ deﬁ  ned contribution account balances 
have generally fallen short of the funds needed to generate the retirement 
income amounts typically provided by deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans. Personal 
non-pension savings, the third leg of the retirement income stool, have 
diminished in recent years and cannot make up for shortfalls in public 
or private pension plan funds. Munnell and Sass conclude that if people 
are going to maintain their living standards in retirement, then retirement 
ages will need to be increased; in other words, Americans will need to 
participate longer in the workforce than has traditionally been the case.
Until recently, the trend was toward retirement at younger ages. The 
increased afﬂ  uence accompanying economic growth during the twentieth 
century made it feasible for people to spend an increasingly long period 
of time toward the end of their lives enjoying more leisure, a phenom-
enon reinforced by early retirement incentives in many private deﬁ  ned-
beneﬁ  t pension plans and by the availability of Social Security beneﬁ  ts 
starting at age 62. The trend toward older men aged 55–64 years tak-
ing early retirement ended in the mid-1980s, and since then has been 
partially reversed. Munnell and Sass attribute this reversal to several 
factors, including changes in Social Security, changes in employer-spon-
sored pensions, the elimination of a mandatory retirement age, shifts in 
employment toward less physically demanding jobs, and the decreasing 
availability of employer-provided retiree health insurance.
Accompanying the trend toward later retirement, Munnell and Sass 
document the changing employment patterns of older workers. In the 
United States, older workers are now less likely to remain with a long-
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term employer as they approach retirement than was previously the case. 
The decrease in job tenure among older workers places these workers 
at increased risk of job displacement. Munnell and Sass show that older 
workers are generally at low risk of displacement, but this is because 
older workers are more likely than young workers to have accumulated 
substantial tenure on their jobs. Yet age alone does not protect workers; 
holding tenure constant, older workers are actually at greater risk of dis-
placement than are young workers. 
Increased life expectancy and improved health among the older U.S. 
working-age population, along with decreasing physical demands in 
the workplace, bode well for the ability of most people to extend their 
careers beyond retirement ages that were typical in the past. However, 
Munnell and Sass note that there is still a signiﬁ  cant share of Americans 
in their late 50s and early 60s who would ﬁ  nd continued participation in 
the workforce difﬁ  cult due to poor health or disability. Other obstacles 
to extended work lives they discuss include many employers’ resistance 
to part-time employment and the continued early availability of Social 
Security beneﬁ  ts at age 62. On net, however, Munnell and Sass conclude 
that labor force participation rates of men in their late 50s and 60s are 
likely to continue to increase. 
In his comments, Robert Hutchens notes that the Munnell and Sass 
paper is very relevant to the current policy debate on how government 
transfer programs serving older Americans should be reformed. If older 
Americans can easily ﬁ  nd decent jobs and remain physically capable of 
working, then solving Social Security’s ﬁ  scal problems by reducing the 
growth of beneﬁ  ts below that mandated by current law would be much 
more palatable than it would be under an alternative scenario, where 
many older Americans are either unable to ﬁ  nd work or become too frail 
to work as they age. 
Hutchens believes that we need additional information in order to 
answer two important questions regarding the changing labor market 
for older people. First, how do the trends in labor force participation 
differ by educational attainment? Less-educated workers might be suffer-
ing disproportionately from changes in Social Security and private pen-
sions, but also likely have job prospects that are less favorable than are 
those for individuals with more education. Second, how will employers Introduction 14
respond to the increased supply of older workers? Will ﬁ  rms be able to 
accommodate older workers’ changing needs and allow them to stay in 
long-term career jobs, or will older people largely end up in a spot market 
for non-career jobs and lose the job-speciﬁ  c human capital that they had 
previously accumulated?
Joyce Manchester focuses her comments on two reasons for being 
optimistic regarding the prospects for delayed retirement and increased 
retirement income: trends in the early claiming of Old-Age Social Security 
beneﬁ  ts, and older women’s labor force participation. Manchester pres-
ents evidence from the Social Security Administration’s records showing 
that people who claim beneﬁ  ts before age 65 tend to have weaker attach-
ment to the labor force, and lower earnings, before claiming beneﬁ  ts than 
do those who claim at 65. The full retirement age for Social Security 
beneﬁ  ts is being gradually increased from 65 to 67 under current law, and 
the penalty associated with claiming beneﬁ  ts at 62 rather than at the full 
retirement age is increasing. Manchester shows that this change in Social 
Security appears to be discouraging beneﬁ  t claims at age 62, with the 
implication that we can expect further delays in retirement as the Social 
Security full retirement age continues to increase. 
Turning to the issue of the labor force participation of older women, 
Manchester notes that women nearing retirement age increasingly do so 
after spending much of their adult lives in the labor force. As a result, 
older women are more likely to receive Social Security beneﬁ  ts based on 
their own earnings record, rather than receiving spousal beneﬁ  ts, and will 
also be more likely to have their own private pensions and health insur-
ance than were women in earlier cohorts.
Session 3: How Structural Shifts in Labor Demand Affect Labor 
Supply Prospects
David Autor’s paper explores the interaction of labor demand and labor 
supply, and its implications for the wage structure and future labor sup-
ply responses in the United States. Autor documents that the widely rec-
ognized growth in U.S. earnings inequality can be usefully divided into 
two stages. During the 1970s and 1980s, real wages fell at the bottom 
of the earnings distribution and rose moderately at the top. In contrast, 
during the 1990s and early 2000s there was strong growth of real wages 
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at the top of the distribution, and modest real growth in the bottom tier, 
with the middle of the wage distribution experiencing the least income 
growth. 
Autor then turns to the question of how shifts in labor demand likely 
inﬂ  uenced these changes in the U.S. wage structure. A simple model that 
divides workers into high school graduates and college-educated equiva-
lents does well in explaining changes in wages from 1963 through 1992, 
and implies that there was a strong shift in demand toward college-edu-
cated workers. However, a more complex model is needed to explain the 
data from 1993 onward, the period in which Autor argues that wage 
growth “polarized,” with wages at the top and bottom of the distribution 
rising faster those in the middle. 
Autor considers a number of candidate explanations for this polariza-
tion. Decreases in the real value of the minimum wage, which some stud-
ies have found to be a major source of growing income inequality in the 
United States, cannot explain why wages in the middle of the distribution 
have stagnated more than those at the bottom. Autor believes that a more 
promising explanation is that technological change and off-shoring have 
increased the demand for strong cognitive and interpersonal skills typical 
of highly educated professionals and managers, and decreased the demand 
for routine analytical and mechanical skills typical of middle-tier work-
ers. Technological change and off-shoring have relatively little impact on 
low-level service jobs, which are currently difﬁ  cult to automate or trade 
across international borders. Autor points out that the aging of the U.S. 
population will likely increase the demand for such services in the future, 
as may growing demand for services by high income households. So, con-
tinued polarization of the U.S. wage distribution seems likely.
How might labor supply respond to the recent changes in wage struc-
ture? Autor points to evidence showing that barriers to college attendance 
by youth from low- and moderate-income families remain substantial, and 
suggests that reducing these barriers would help increase the supply of 
highly educated workers, and attenuate further increases of inequality at 
the high end of the wage distribution. Liberalized immigration policies for 
highly educated workers would also help to reduce high-end inequality.
In his comments on Autor’s paper, Jared Bernstein takes issue with the 
augmented version of the skill-biased technical change explanation for Introduction 16
growing inequality put forth by Autor. While applauding the movement 
away from the less-nuanced version of the skill-biased technical change 
story, Bernstein still has doubts about the centrality of skill bias in explain-
ing changes in the earnings distribution. Although he does not deny the 
existence of complementarity between technology and skills, Bernstein 
cites his own research with Lawrence Mishel that raises doubts regarding 
whether the pace of skill-biased technical change has accelerated sufﬁ  -
ciently over time to explain the growth of earnings inequality. Bernstein 
believes that a promising alternative, or perhaps complementary, expla-
nation is change in economic policies and institutions, a hypothesis put 
forward in recent research by Frank Levy and Peter Temin. However, 
Bernstein notes that there is no “smoking gun” evidence for the centrality 
of either skill-biased changes in technology or changes in institutions as 
an explanation for growing inequality. The policy implications of the two 
explanations differ signiﬁ  cantly—enhanced education and job training 
are the primary policy tools to address skill-biased technological change, 
while if institutional change is the primary source of growing inequality, 
a broader set of policies governing labor relations is prescribed.
Gary Burtless also notes that institutional change has played a role in 
the growth of inequality. Decreases in private sector union coverage and 
shifts in pay-setting norms have contributed to growing inequality. Most 
of Burtless’s comment, however, focuses on the supply side of the labor 
market. He notes that although there were substantial increases in the 
educational wage premium during much of the time since 1980, there 
have been only relatively modest increases in college attendance and 
degree attainment. Men, in particular, seem to have barely responded to 
the increased economic rewards that accrue to postsecondary schooling. 
Burtless questions why educational attainment has responded so weakly 
to the increase in its economic return. He presents data showing that 
most other OECD countries have experienced substantial increases in 
postsecondary schooling over the past 20 years, while the United States 
has not. One possible explanation explored by Burtless is that many 
low- and moderate-income families in the United States lack the means 
to effectively push their children to attend college. Paying for their chil-
dren’s tuition and fees may seem unaffordable to such families, and they 
may not be fully informed about the possibility of ﬁ  nancial aid. In many 
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other high-income countries, in contrast, students face little or no out-of-
pocket tuition expenses. This hypothesis is consistent with data showing 
that recent increases in college attendance have been concentrated among 
young adults from relatively afﬂ  uent families.
Session 4: The Cyclical Sensitivity of Labor Supply
In the conference’s fourth paper, Robert E. Hall analyzes the responsive-
ness of labor supply to business-cycle inﬂ  uences. He starts by noting that 
macroeconomists generally believe that short-run business-cycle move-
ments in wages and employment stem primarily from changes in labor 
demand, not labor supply.1 The macroeconomist’s task is to learn how 
changes in labor demand interact with workers’ labor-supply preferences 
to generate observed changes in wages and employment. For example, 
if labor supply is inelastic, workers are relatively willing to accept wage 
cuts in order to keep their jobs. A decline in labor demand will then bring 
about a sizeable drop in wages and little change in employment. On the 
other hand, a more elastic model of labor supply would generate large 
changes in employment and small changes in wages when labor demand 
declines. This latter, elastic pattern is closer to what we see in the mac-
roeconomic data, but explaining it runs into a fundamental problem: 
most microeconomic studies ﬁ  nd that workers are relatively unwilling 
to substitute work for leisure (or vice versa) when wages change. This 
unwillingness makes their individual labor-supply schedules inelastic, not 
elastic. Given the inelasticity of the labor-leisure trade-off among indi-
vidual workers, it is hard to see how changes in aggregate labor demand 
could raise or lower employment for the entire economy.
To solve this puzzle, a number of economists are working to expand 
the labor-leisure trade-off assumed in traditional labor supply models. 
These researchers argue that a third activity—job search while unem-
ployed—should be added to the worker’s list of potential uses of time. If 
unemployed workers must take time to search for new jobs, then there 
will be a pool of potential workers that could be added to the employ-
ment ranks when labor demand increases (or subtracted from the measure 
of employment when demand falls). This addition would make “labor 
supply” for the aggregate economy more elastic than that of individual 
workers. For job-search considerations to be important, however, the size Introduction 18
of this unemployed pool of workers must be sensitive to labor demand. 
Total labor input must change in recessions and expansions primarily 
due to changes in the unemployment rate, not because more workers are 
choosing to participate in the labor market (the participation margin) or 
because workers who are working decide to spend more or less time on 
their jobs (the hours margin). The central goal of Hall’s paper is to show 
that unemployment is sufﬁ  ciently sensitive to labor demand for this to 
be the case.
Hall starts with a careful examination of the data he will use for 
this exercise, discussing how employment, hours, and participation are 
measured in the United States. He argues that the Current Population 
Survey’s measure of employment generated by a survey of households is 
preferable to a measure generated by a survey of ﬁ  rms conducted by the 
Current Employment Statistics program (sometimes called the Establish-
ment Survey). Using the household-based measure of employment is pre-
ferred because this measure is more likely to be consistent with the hours 
and participation measures, which also come from the household survey. 
Hall’s next step is to obtain a direct measure of shifts in labor demand. 
He does this by using statistical theory to extract a common measure of 
labor-market cyclicality from three fundamental correlates of the health 
of the labor market: unemployment, average weekly hours, and real per-
sonal disposable income per capita. 
Once this measure of labor demand is constructed, Hall measures its 
correlation with the three potential margins on which labor input can 
adjust over the business cycle: unemployment, participation, and hours. 
He ﬁ  nds that about 56 percent of the variability in total labor input is due 
to ﬂ  uctuations in unemployment, with 12 percent coming from the par-
ticipation margin and the remaining 32 percent coming from the hours-
per-worker margin. The results suggest that unemployment is sufﬁ  ciently 
cyclical to support the new theoretical work on job search as a formal 
alternative use of time in models of the business cycle. Hall concludes 
that: “More than half of the extra labor input in a cyclical upswing is 
drawn from the ranks of the unemployed. No model of the cycle in the 
labor market can claim any realism unless it takes this ﬁ  nding seriously.” 
Katharine Abraham begins her discussion of Hall’s paper by review-
ing three potentially important characteristics of his new labor-demand 
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index. First, the index is based on common variation in the fundamental 
correlates (weekly hours, real personal disposable income, and unem-
ployment). The common business-cycle variation in these correlates is 
assumed to be unrelated to their long-term trend movements, which are 
modeled as separate fourth-order functions of time. Yet detrending the 
data with fourth-order trends (rather than some other type of detrend-
ing procedure) may also remove useful business-cycle variation from the 
data. Second, using real personal disposable income as one of the funda-
mental variables may contaminate the measure as a pure labor-demand 
index, because this income variable also includes proprietors’ income and 
government transfers, in addition to wage payments. Third and perhaps 
most importantly, Abraham says that Hall may want to use total hours as 
one of the fundamental correlates, rather than using both weekly hours 
and the employment rate separately. Hall’s procedure allows the common 
variation in weekly hours and employment to contribute to his labor-
demand index. But ﬁ  rms probably think about variation in hours and 
employment as distinctly different margins of adjustment, because hir-
ing a new worker includes ﬁ  xed costs (such as health insurance). These 
additional costs for new hires are not accrued when varying the hours of 
workers whom a ﬁ  rm already employs. As a result, the common varia-
tion in hours and employment does not have a clean interpretation.
Abraham then discusses how Hall’s labor-demand index correlates with 
the three potential margins of adjustment (unemployment, per-worker 
hours, and participation). She notes that these margins may be correlated 
with the index at various time lags, which are not accounted for in Hall’s 
analysis. Also, he ﬁ  nds the correlation between per-worker hours and 
the labor-demand index to be surprisingly large; this may reﬂ  ect Hall’s 
treatment of hours and employment as separate fundamental variables, 
as noted earlier. Finally, Abraham agrees that the difference between 
employment totals from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ separate payroll 
and household surveys remains a puzzle. The answer may involve a bet-
ter understanding of business-cycle variation in “off-the-books” employ-
ment, or a rethinking of the population weights in the household survey.
Susanto Basu starts his comments by outlining the differences between 
the workhorse Keynesian model of the labor market and the newer 
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view argues for pervasive “stickiness” in both prices and wages over the 
business cycle. Because both variables are about equally sticky, as a result 
there is little cyclical variation in real wages in the standard Keynesian 
model. The approach favored by Hall instead argues that real-wage 
inﬂ  exibility results from search considerations. Once a ﬁ  rm and worker 
make a good match, they are loath to destroy it simply because the real 
wage has not changed in exactly the way that a frictionless model of the 
business cycle would imply. As of yet, there is little evidence in the data to 
distinguish between the older Keynesian approach and the newer search-
based approach. Both models not only accept the presence of involuntary 
unemployment (unlike more neoclassical models), but also explain this 
unemployment as a function of inﬂ  exible real wages. Only the explana-
tion for real-wage rigidity differs in the two models. Eventually, distin-
guishing between the Keynesian and search-based frameworks in the data 
will likely result in a better understanding of how these models respond 
to speciﬁ  c types of shocks. 
Basu then takes issue with one assumption of Hall’s exercise; namely, 
that most of the observed short-run changes in hours and unemploy-
ment are due to shifts in labor demand rather than in labor supply. Basu 
pointed out that changes in government spending typically raise employ-
ment, but this cannot be because the labor-demand curve shifts to the 
right, since there have been no corresponding changes in the fundamental 
determinants of labor demand (such as the amount of capital per worker, 
or total factor productivity). 
Session 5: Labor Supply and Labor Demand in the Long Run
The ﬁ  fth paper of the conference was written by Dale W. Jorgenson, 
Richard J. Goettle, Mun S. Ho, Daniel T. Slesnick, and Peter J. Wilcoxen 
(henceforth JGHSW). The paper presents a formal model of future U.S. 
labor supply and demand, derived from a fully speciﬁ  ed  neoclassical 
growth model. At its heart, the model presented is the famous growth 
model developed by Nobel Prize winner Robert Solow in the late 1950s. 
It is meant to be a long-run characterization of an economy, so it assumes 
away the short-run business cycle movements that lie at the heart of the 
analysis in the previous paper by Hall. The neoclassical growth model 
focuses instead on the determinants of potential long-term growth, which 
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are the rate of population growth and the rate of technological progress. 
From these variables, a long-run rate of capital accumulation is endog-
enously determined. Finally, the contributions of population growth, 
technological progress, and capital accumulation are added together to 
obtain the growth rate of potential output.
This characterization of the neoclassical growth model would be famil-
iar to most undergraduate economics students. But the JGHSW paper 
delves deeply into the inner workings of the neoclassical model to pro-
vide more speciﬁ  c predictions about where the U.S. economy is headed. 
For example, the authors do not merely assume that the amount of labor 
services available to produce output is simply proportional to the work-
ing-age population. Rather, the authors use various measures of “labor 
quality” (such as education and experience) to adjust the labor input 
according to how productive it is likely to be. Along the same lines, the 
model does not assume a single overall rate of technological progress 
for the entire economy. Instead, it uses sophisticated econometric tools 
to measure the rate of technological progress in a number of individ-
ual industries, and then models how these rates are likely to change in 
the future. Additionally, the techniques allow the authors to determine 
whether technological progress in any speciﬁ  c industry is likely to be 
“labor using” or “labor saving.” 
The central message of this bottom-up forecasting approach to predict 
future output is that the U.S. economy will grow much more slowly dur-
ing the next quarter-century than it has since 1960. Overall GDP growth 
will slow from 3.2 percent in the 1960–2004 period to 1.6 percent in the 
2004–2030 period. In large part, this decline is driven by well-anticipated 
declines in the growth of labor input. Labor services grew at an annual rate 
of 1.73 percent in the 1960–2004 period, but will grow at less than half this 
annual rate (0.74 percent per year) from 2004 to 2030. Importantly, the 
decline in labor input growth is less severe than the decline in the growth 
of the working-age population, because labor quality will continue to rise, 
albeit more slowly than in the past. The rate of technological progress will 
be essentially unchanged across the two periods, slightly less than 0.50 
percent per year. “In summary,” the authors write, “the potential growth 
of the U.S. economy will be slowing considerably between 2004 and 2030, 
and monetary policy will have to adapt to the new environment.”Introduction 22
Richard Berner begins his discussion by noting that the gloomy pro-
ductivity predictions in the JGHSW paper may turn out to be too pes-
simistic. Projecting future productivity growth is exceptionally difﬁ  cult, 
in large part because of data limitations. As an example, ofﬁ  cial measures 
of productivity in the construction industry imply that it has been on a 
decades-long decline, which is hard to believe given the boom in con-
struction that has characterized much of this period. Part of the reason 
that measuring productivity is so difﬁ  cult is that the productivity data are 
based in part on compensation data, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
procedures may not be keeping up with the changing ways that workers 
are rewarded in the modern American labor market.
 Berner then turns to the authors’ assumptions about future labor sup-
ply. He notes that labor supply among older workers appears sensitive to 
government policy; as an example, many older workers stay on the job 
just long enough until they qualify for Medicare. Changing the eligibility 
age for Medicare would therefore change the labor supply of older work-
ers. Policies on immigration also affect the number of available work-
ers in ways that the JGHSW paper cannot predict. Berner concludes by 
noting that the globalization of labor markets will undoubtedly affect 
returns that workers can expect in the U.S. labor market. Globalization 
will thereby inﬂ  uence labor-force participation decisions among Ameri-
can residents. Without understanding the relationship between wages and 
various components of globalization (such as outsourcing), it is hard to 
predict future labor-supply behavior. Indeed, looking around the world, 
we ﬁ  nd very different labor-supply behaviors even within the small group 
of afﬂ   uent industrialized/advanced economies; France chose to enjoy 
more leisure as its productivity levels rose, while the United States chose 
to work more.
Eric Brynjolfsson’s discussion starts with two comments about the sta-
bility of the relationships on which the JGHSW paper is based. First, the 
model requires some predictions for future consumption patterns, which 
are essentially extrapolated from consumption patterns today. But some 
items in today’s consumption bundles, which contain cell phones and 
iPods, were not even around 25 years ago. How can we possibly know 
what people will buy in 2030? A second concern about the model’s sta-
bility echoes Berner’s comments: it is difﬁ  cult even to measure past or 
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current productivity, let alone predict it decades from now. Ofﬁ  cial pro-
ductivity ﬁ  gures show big changes from year to year, and even productiv-
ity levels for the same year can change dramatically as different revisions 
of the data are made. While applied researchers must use the productivity 
data currently available, the intense volatility and large revisions in these 
data should caution us to take productivity predictions with a grain of 
salt. Brynjolfsson then pointed out that the authors face difﬁ  cult statis-
tical issues that are common to many economic models. The authors 
make extensive use of prices (as well as quantities) to infer changes in 
technology, so they face classic issues of simultaneity: if a price drops, is 
this because supply increased, or demand declined? The authors use well-
established statistical techniques to deal with this issue, and they verify 
that these techniques are appropriate. But some results in their paper 
suggest potential problems, including their ﬁ  nding that particular inputs 
appear to be used more intensively when their prices rise. 
Brynjolfsson then turned to the paper’s assumption that business 
productivity increases as soon as new machines are installed. His own 
research has shown that for most ﬁ  rms, the installation of a new informa-
tion technology (IT) system is just the “tip of the iceberg” in improving 
productivity. After a new IT system is purchased, ﬁ  rms must then train 
their employees to use it. Occasionally, they have to rework their entire 
mode of operation to make the best use of the new technology. 
The authors’ pessimistic assumptions seem hard to square with Bryn-
jolfsson’s intuitive understanding of how tomorrow’s businesses will 
make use of future technology. In a matter of decades, advances in com-
puting power will allow machines to mimic and perhaps surpass the com-
putational power of the human brain. He concludes by noting that as 
various computing thresholds are reached and then exceeded, technology 
will probably play an even bigger role in the productivity of the American 
economy than we can predict today.
Current and Future Challenges for Policy and Research
A wide-ranging panel discussion addressed various ways to increase the 
quality and versatility of the U.S. workforce as one offset to slowing 
growth in the quantity of prime-age labor supplied in the coming years. 
At the upper end of the working age distribution, however, as pointed out Introduction 24
repeatedly in earlier sessions, the private sector behavior of individuals 
and ﬁ  rms is highly inﬂ  uenced by the current rules regarding the eligibility 
ages for Social Security and Medicare. Thus, it seems that the govern-
ment will have to drive changes in behavior by instituting changes in 
these programs.
Public Policy and the Labor Supply of Older Americans
Stanford Ross argues that the current legal framework in the United States 
is highly favorable to early retirement, and addresses the issue of whether 
and how the Social Security laws, U.S. tax laws, and laws governing pri-
vate pensions and individual savings can be changed to provide fewer 
incentives to retire early and more encouragement to work longer. Ross 
suggests that the Social Security system was not intentionally designed 
to favor early retirement, but these incentives developed from “almost 
random” political decisions and changing circumstances. While several 
changes made recently have reduced the incentives to take early retirement, 
the changes are so gradual that potential retirees are essentially unaware 
that the incentives have shifted. Furthermore, once these changes to Social 
Security’s normal retirement age and delayed retirement credit are fully in 
place, the regime will continue to be highly favorable to early retirement. 
Ross says that while it would be possible to speed up some of the 
legislated transitions and change the beneﬁ  t formula to provide enhance-
ments for continued work, the major change that could make a difference 
would be to move the early eligibility age from 62 years to 65 years. Such 
a change would almost necessarily have to be part of a larger package of 
changes along many dimensions (such as raising minimum beneﬁ  ts for 
lower-wage workers and/or providing tax credits to employers of older 
workers), and probably would entail further increases in the normal 
retirement age. To be politically feasible, a comprehensive package would 
need to reﬂ  ect bipartisan efforts, which is currently unrealistic.
Even without a major overhaul, however, the government might enact 
marginal changes that will affect retirement incentives, particularly by 
acting on health care. Beyond that, Ross argues that economic changes 
are more likely to inﬂ  uence the behavior of individuals and ﬁ  rms than 
are changes in laws. For example, if the economy falters and wealth pros-
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pects are diminished, resulting in workers feeling more insecure about 
their retirement, that could provide an impetus for working longer. On 
the employer side, if major labor shortages emerge, perhaps because 
immigration is curtailed and outsourcing is restricted, ﬁ  rms may need 
to adjust to a diminished labor supply by taking steps to employ older 
workers. But currently, neither employers nor aging workers seem par-
ticularly motivated to seek such changes.
The Seven Deadly Sins in Aging Policy and Research: A Cautionary 
List for Policymakers and Prognosticators
C. Eugene Steuerle, the conference’s keynote speaker, provides a useful 
alternative perspective by addressing some potential inadequacies of cur-
rent policy-relevant research on population aging. By casting these issues 
as the “seven deadly sins,” Steuerle establishes a counterpoint to the rest 
of the conference sessions that offers a ﬁ  tting end to this summary and 
book. Steuerle reminds us that while anticipating the future and planning 
for it as best we can is important, we may be eliding some considerations 
along the way. In other words, a little less hubris and a little more humil-
ity may be in order as we grapple with how the U.S. labor supply may 
unfold in the following decades.
Steuerle contends that the ﬁ  rst “deadly sin” of aging policy research 
is paying “too little attention to the labor side of the aging debate.” 
He believes that changes in retirement behavior have received too little 
attention as a potential solution to economic problems associated with 
population aging. The second sin is “policymaking without any real 
targets.” The fundamental objectives underlying policy proposals such 
as preserving the current Social Security system or creating individual 
accounts within this system, as the Bush administration proposed in 
2005, are scarcely discussed and analyzed. The third deadly sin is “limit-
ing the debate so as to be politically correct.” As an example, Steuerle 
cites the structure of family beneﬁ  ts embedded in the current Social Secu-
rity framework that are at odds with contemporary social realities in the 
United States. Most observers would agree privately that the current sys-
tem makes little sense, but would shy away from proposing bold reforms 
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The fourth deadly sin is misuse of the term “aging.” Steuerle notes 
that we persist in measuring the old-age threshold as starting at a ﬁ  xed 
number of years, such as age 65, even though people at given ages today 
generally are much healthier and have longer life expectancy than did 
their counterparts in past generations. If instead we gauged the concept 
of old age as corresponding to a given remaining life expectancy, then we 
would have a very different perspective on the problems associated with 
population aging. The ﬁ  fth deadly sin is “ignoring the balance sheet.” As 
an example, Steuerle notes that calculations of the effect of changes in 
retirement behavior commonly extend to changes in Social Security ben-
eﬁ  ts and payroll tax revenues, but rarely, if ever, extend to the effects on 
national output and general tax revenues. The sixth deadly sin is “assum-
ing away arbitrary aspects of the status quo.” Although status quo poli-
cies are often arbitrary or accidental, policy analysts tend to view these as 
having resulted from rational policymaking decisions taken when these 
policies were implemented, and display reluctance to recommend radical 
changes. A recurring idea throughout the conference has been the need 
for bold new thinking on these issues. 
Finally, the seventh, and according to Steuerle, the most deadly sin of 
all is “hubris about knowing the future.” In the aging ﬁ  eld, we tend to 
design our policies to ﬁ  t our current views at the future expense of pre-
venting “our children from following other visions for how their society 
evolves.” By putting in place rigid programs that promise transfer pay-
ments into the indeﬁ  nite future, we essentially tie the hands of future 
policymakers. This runs the risk of binding future generations to policies 
inappropriate to their situation and values. 
*  *  *
It is clear that the coming few decades will be accompanied by major 
changes in the U.S. labor supply and pose challenges to the U.S. economy, 
particularly in connection with the baby boom generation’s transition 
into what traditionally have been considered retirement years. How the 
United States deals with the implications of these changes will help set the 
nation’s economic and political course for the twenty-ﬁ  rst century. This 
volume, consisting of papers ﬁ  rst presented at the conference and then 
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revised for the book, showcases some of the important considerations 
involved in addressing these trends, and the opportunities that may arise 
if we confront these challenges creatively and forthrightly.
Note
1.  The primacy of labor-demand shocks as drivers of business cycles implies that 
employment declines in recessions because ﬁ  rms ﬁ  nd it less proﬁ  table to hire 
employees, not because workers suddenly decide to work less. To use more for-
mal economic language: Hall assumes that in a supply-and-demand model of the 
labor market, the labor-demand curve shifts along an unchanging labor supply-
curve when a recession or expansion occurs.